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Abstract
The chapter retraces the impact of the two main intangible heritage 
policies (ICH) on individuals and communities in the cities of Jiujiang and 
Changzhou. Although ICH policies are aimed at supporting local cultural 
work, the chapter shows how local policy implementation facilitates divi-
sion and hierarchies among local stakeholders, particularly as inscription 
often depends on good connections to heritage experts and off icials. In 
the competition for inscription, local stakeholders often employ off icial 
heritage discourses and heritage expertise to enhance their agency and 
obtain legitimacy in the heritage-making process, enhancing contestation 
and conflicts between members within and between local communities.
Keywords: intangible cultural heritage, transmitters, policy, discourses, 
contestation
Through ratif ication of the 2003 United Nations Educational, Scientif ic and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention for the Safeguarding of Intan-
gible Cultural Heritage, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has committed 
itself to set up an institutional infrastructure and adopt policies for the pro-
tection of traditional cultural practices. When implementing the UNESCO 
Convention, the PRC not only established a representative list for intangible 
cultural heritage, but also set up a Chinese Living Human Treasures system, 
the so-called intangible cultural heritage (ICH) transmitter system, on all 
four administrative levels (see Blumenfield as well as Chan in this volume). 
As a result of governmental promotion and awareness-building, traditional 
cultural practices which had previously been gauged as ‘superstitious’ and 
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‘feudal’, were now re-evaluated and relabelled as intangible cultural herit-
age. Since the mid-2000s, an ‘intangible cultural heritage fever’ ( feiyi re) 
has swept across Chinese society, rekindling public interest in traditional 
Chinese culture. The fever has also substantiated the wish to participate 
in local heritagization processes. While the government appropriates ICH 
as a tool of governance to regulate social order, modernize isolated regions 
through tourism, as well as increase the public’s ‘quality’ (suzhi) (Oakes 
2013), local stakeholders in turn are utilizing governmental ICH policies to 
enhance their agency within the heritagization process. By participating 
in ICH policy implementation,1 governmental ICH programmes or heritage 
discourses, local stakeholders are actively striving to obtain a voice in local 
identity formation and heritage-making.
This chapter enquires into how local stakeholders affected by top-down 
ICH policy implementation develop individual strategies to enhance their 
agency and/or contest the top-down policy implementation and outcome 
from below. To do so, the study comparatively examines how the two main 
intangible heritage policies, the ‘representative ICH items list’ and the ‘ICH 
transmitter list’, have an impact on individuals and communities in Jiangsu 
and Jiangxi Provinces, particularly focusing on Changzhou municipality 
(Jiangsu Province) and Jiujiang municipality (Jiangxi Province). Although 
these policies are aimed at supporting local traditions and individual 
cultural work, local implementation of these policies has brought about 
division and hierarchies among local stakeholders, since only a limited 
number of local traditions and cultural practitioners may be inscribed 
on governmental safeguarding lists and thus receive state funding and 
support. Furthermore, inscription often depends on good connections to 
heritage experts and off icials. Local stakeholders involved, such as cultural 
practitioners aiming to become an off icial representative ICH transmit-
ter or locals striving to have their local tradition enlisted, individually 
employ off icial heritage discourses and heritage expertise to enhance their 
agency and obtain legitimacy in the heritage-making process. As a result, 
* The author gratefully acknowledges the generous funding support of this publication by 
the Volkswagen Foundation, issued within its initiative ‘Key Issues for Research and Society’ 
for the research project ‘Protecting the Weak: Entangled Processes of Framing, Mobilization 
and Institutionalization in East Asia’ (AZ 87 382) at the Interdisciplinary Centre for East Asian 
Studies (IZO), Goethe University, Frankfurt/Main.
1 Although an autocracy, non-state actors in the PRC are increasingly able to participate in 
the policy process (Mertha 2009) by taking part in policy implementation, policy programmes 
or shaping public discourses (Maags and Holbig 2016).
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competition for inscription leads to contestation and conflicts between 
members within and between local communities.
Cultural heritage as a playing field for top-down and bottom-up 
processes
Power struggles and contestations resulting from ICH policies in China 
appear to be caused by a mismatch between the predefined goals of a given 
ICH policy and the outcome of policy implementation.2 Yet, the politics 
surrounding heritage are much more complex than this picture leads us to 
believe. As heritage is ‘a new form of cultural production of the present that 
takes recourse to the past’ (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1995: 269), a plurality of 
economic, political and cultural stakeholders compete with each other to 
push through their interpretation of the past. Furthermore, each of these 
actors use their agency and resources to add value to certain historical 
remains and traditional practices, resulting in tensions over who holds the 
power to def ine what cultural heritage is and what it is not (Bendix 2009: 
253-260). Yet, as Bendix et al. (2013) remind us, ‘It is not simply human actors 
seeking or wielding power and holding control: The regimes themselves, 
as realised in unfolding bureaucratic institutions and processes, discipline 
both actors and their cultural practices into (perhaps) unforeseen dynamics’ 
(2013: 16). While the institutional setting including policies and laws as well 
as off icial discourses thus delineate the playing f ield on which the actors 
interact, their power struggles and contestations result in unpredictable 
repercussions for state and society.
These dynamics are produced by the interplay between top-down 
processes of ICH policy formulation and implementation on the one hand, 
and bottom-up processes of reimagining and contesting off icial concep-
tualizations of heritage on the other. Heritage is an important national 
symbol which diffuses ideas of the nation, national identities and collective 
identity, thereby fostering social inclusion but also economic regeneration 
and localism (Pendlebury 2015: 437). As such the state has a vested interest in 
controlling cultural heritage discourses and means of protection. Laurajane 
Smith has pointed out that the off icial or ‘authorized heritage discourse’ 
inherent in the various international heritage conventions which forms the 
2 A discrepancy between policy design and policy implementation is a common phenomenon. 
Policy scholars therefore employ policy implementation and evaluation theories to examine 
why and how these discrepancies occur (Mazmanian and Sabatier 1980). 
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basis of domestic policies, in fact also authorizes institutions of heritage 
to create or identify a community of cultural practitioners, conservation-
ists and experts (2006: 113). Top-down processes thus not only stipulate 
what heritage is (or is not) but also who is provided with the opportunity 
to represent and speak for it. Non-off icial stakeholders, however, are not 
passive receivers but active participants in these heritagization processes. 
Due to this reason, ‘contestation is at the core of numerous discourses about 
heritage, be it in the commemoration of past violence, ancient greatness 
or everyday life’ (Schramm 2015: 443). Non-state actors use their agency to 
counter off icial narratives and demand participation in def ining cultural 
heritage, to the extent of mobilizing public opinion to challenge authorized 
discourses and influence policy making (Cooper 2013; Neil 2015: 348). In this 
act of ‘heritage from below’, Robertson has argued that ‘anti-hegemonic 
possibilities do exist and exist as resources for expressions of identity and 
ways of life that run counter to the dominant’ (2012: 2). As a result, numer-
ous heritages are imagined and recognized leading to a ‘dissonance’ in 
heritage-making (Tunbridge and Ashworth 1995).
In the PRC, this interplay between top-down and bottom-up processes 
is similarly complex, yet further couched in rapid processes of economic 
development and social change. A bulk of scholars has demonstrated how 
top-down processes of policy formulation and implementation have led to 
the marginalization of vernacular understandings of cultural heritage. Zhu 
and Li (2013), for instance, have shown how governmental plans for local 
tourism sites often neglect popular understandings and local participa-
tion. Instead, cultural heritage is regarded as a resource by which the local 
government can develop the tourism industry and generate revenue (see 
also Su 2010; Wang and Bramwell 2012), thereby exerting cultural authority 
through tourism (Oakes and Sutton 2010: 4). Top-down regulations similarly 
commodify and relabel Chinese ICH. In his analysis of the Gwer Sa La 
Festival in Southwest China, Liang (2013), for instance, has shown how the 
local government has purposefully created false ‘primitive’ imaginaries of 
local ICH in order to inscribe a local traditional religious festival as ICH. 
The relabelling of popular religion or ‘superstition’ as cultural heritage is a 
common phenomenon in China, aimed at de-politicizing and legitimizing 
religion (Chau 2005; Gao 2014). In addition to fostering the local economy 
and administering social control through government heritage regulation 
and management, we can also observe how the party-state has created 
their own Chinese ‘authorized heritage discourse’ (Yan 2015) which is 
similarly informed by international conventions (Du Cros and Lee 2007: 140; 
Li et al. 2008). Through these top-down processes the Chinese party-state 
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develops its own interpretation of Chinese cultural heritage as well as 
‘appropriate’ conservation and safeguarding measures.
Local stakeholders, however, do not always accept this imposition of 
top-down interpretations, regulations and management procedures by the 
party-state, but attempt to contest or negotiate off icial heritage politics. Yu, 
for instance, has demonstrated that while the party-state enlisted traditional 
festivals as ICH and thus transformed them into tourist attractions, villagers 
nonetheless contest the off icial narratives by independently performing 
and transmitting rituals in a sacred domain outside of governmental 
control (2015: 1035). By f inding ways to circumvent top-down authorita-
tive measures, local communities demonstrate agency and autonomy in 
transmitting and further developing their traditional cultural practices. Zhu 
has similarly found that when the party-state adopted, reinterpreted and 
applied the Western notion of authenticity, the authentication of heritage 
became ‘a governance strategy to legitimize inclusion and exclusion and 
to allocate economic, moral and aesthetic values’ (2014: 12). Nevertheless, 
in this specif ic case the villagers challenged the state-imposed authentica-
tion by developing their own meaning and norms in their performance 
(Zhu 2014: 11-12). Moreover, local communities may be empowered through 
the heritagization process by, for instance, benefitting from the tourism 
industry (Ingram 2012: 66-70) or by participating in one of the few projects 
where community participation3 is encouraged (Nitzky 2013: 226).
Contestations do not only arise between the state and experts on the one 
side and local communities on the other, but also within local communities. 
Svensson has drawn our attention to the competition and conflicts that may 
arise between local actors which occur since ‘villagers might differ on what 
narratives and buildings are central to the local community and how these 
narratives should be told’ (2006: 29). Chio (2013) furthermore has shown how 
villages compete against each other for tourism revenue. In other cases, 
villages have competed against each other for being selected as scenic spots, 
thereby obtaining the opportunity to represent local heritage and benefit 
from local tourism (Oakes 2013: 386). The interplay between top-down and 
bottom-up processes in China, as elsewhere, is thus heavily influenced 
by constantly changing power relations between local stakeholders such 
3 Projects where the community is encouraged to participate in the heritagization process, 
however, remain to be rare. Not only are many of such projects induced by international NGOs 
or organizations, the party-state frequently regards participation more as a responsibility to 
support state policy implementation, rather than enhancing rights and agency of the community 
(Nitzky 2013: 226; see also Fan 2014).
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as government off icials, experts, local businesses, cultural practitioners 
and the like (see Neil 2015), which all attempt to obtain a voice in local 
heritagization processes.
This chapter retraces the impact of top-down ICH policies on local non-
state stakeholders by focusing on the arising contestations between local 
communities and individual cultural practitioners. In particular, this study 
examines how local stakeholders develop individual strategies to influence 
top-down selection of the ‘ICH items list’ as well as the ‘ICH transmit-
ters list’. For this chapter, the author conducted over 50 semi-structured 
interviews and engaged in participant observation in Jiangsu and Jiangxi 
Province, particularly in Jiujiang and Changzhou municipality. During the 
f ieldwork, the author interviewed local cultural practitioners, ICH off icials 
as well as experts4 involved in the selection process to identify how local 
communities attempt to influence top-down selection of ICH items and 
transmitters5 in a bottom-up manner.
Top-down policy implementation: The ICH items and transmitter 
lists
The Chinese ICH regime is largely based on the creation of two invento-
ries or lists: The list of representative ICH items (Feiwuzhi wenhua yichan 
daibiaoxing xiangmu minglu) and the list of ICH transmitters (Feiwuzhi 
wenhua yichan xiangmu daibiaoxing chuanchengren). While the ‘ICH items 
list’ is similar to the UNESCO’s Representative List of the ICH of Humanity 
and constitutes a selection of Chinese traditional cultural practices, the 
‘ICH transmitters list’ inscribes cultural practitioners who perform these 
traditional practices – comparable to UNESCO’s Living Human Treasures 
system. Both lists are thus established to raise awareness for ICH protection 
and support practitioners who embody traditional cultural knowledge 
(State Council 2005; State Council 2008).
Top-down implementation of these policies on all four administrative 
levels is the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture and its subordinate 
4 In this chapter, the term ‘ICH experts’ is used to describe the bulk of scholars and profession-
als who advise the party-state in ICH-related work. As heritage experts create and legitimize the 
off icial heritage discourse (Smith 2006), they are included in the analysis. Despite an autocracy, 
in the PRC experts exert signif icant influence in ICH policy formulation and implementation 
(Maags and Holbig 2016).
5 As this chapter is derived from a larger research project on the ICH transmitter programme, 
particular emphasis was put on the selection process within this programme.
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agencies (Ministry of Culture 2008). To date, the Ministry’s subordinate 
agency, the ICH department, has published four national ICH items lists 
and four ICH transmitters lists (China News 2012). When selecting tra-
ditional cultural practices and practitioners for these lists, the Ministry 
is supported by ICH experts. These experts, such as anthropologists and 
Figure 5.1  An ICH transmitter in Nanjing
photograph by Christina Maags
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ethnologists, assist the party-state in its ICH-related work by conducting 
national and regional surveys, compiling dossiers, and recommending 
certain ICH practices and practitioners for inscription (Shanghai Culture 
and Broadcasting Department 2010). The local community is, however, 
not included in the selection process (Interview 6/2014) despite the ICH 
Convention’s stipulation that ‘each State Party shall endeavor to ensure 
the widest possible participation of communities, groups and, where ap-
propriate, individuals that create, maintain and transmit such heritage, 
and to involve them actively in its management’ (UNESCO 2003). While 
the party-state identif ies and selects ICH practices for inscription, cultural 
practitioners need to apply to become ICH transmitters. If selected for the 
ICH transmitters programme, they off icially receive the title ‘ICH transmit-
ter’ as well as an annual stipend which is to support the practitioner in 
transmitting his traditional knowledge to the next generation. In return, 
the cultural practitioner agrees to teach students, participate in public 
events and publish on his respective cultural tradition (Interview 15/2015). 
As the Ministry of Culture establishes lists on all four administrative levels, 
the ICH items as well as ICH transmitters may be promoted up the ladder, 
ultimately becoming a national or even international representative of 
Chinese traditional culture.
Due to the four-tier policy design and implementation structure, the 
system of ICH lists creates institutional hierarchies between ICH items and 
ICH transmitters. By selecting certain cultural practices and labelling them 
‘intangible cultural heritage’, the party-state adds value to some practices 
and practitioners while marginalizing others. As ‘one’s self-awareness is 
dependent on the experience of social recognition’ (Honneth 2002: 46), 
selecting certain ICH and cultural practitioners over others and thus 
recognizing their value through lists leads to exclusion and depreciation 
of others. Following Thompson, ‘political recognition’ creates public rec-
ognition and becomes a marker of identity, due to which the recognized 
feels included and equal, while the one not recognized feels overlooked and 
unvalued (2006: 7-8). While the dynamics around recognition of heritage 
(Smith 2015) particularly the resulting inclusion and exclusion effects of 
def ining cultural heritage (MacKenzie and Stone 1994; Silverman 2011) 
through inventories or lists (Hafstein 2009) have long been discussed and 
criticised, the implementation of these lists along a four-tier system in 
China further enhances these effects by not only creating competition and 
contestation over which practice or practitioner is listed (and which is not), 
but also concerning which ICH is more valuable and thus more eligible to 
climb the hierarchical ladder.
This content downloaded from 195.195.176.5 on Thu, 13 Jun 2019 12:07:05 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Creating a raCe to tHe top 129
As provincial governments enjoy leeway in realizing national poli-
cies (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; for an example of the fragmented 
authority in Chinese heritage administration, see Cui in this volume), ICH 
policy formulation and implementation differ across provinces. On the 
one hand, in Jiangsu Province, the provincial culture bureau was quick 
to adopt its own policies as well as establish ICH items and transmitters 
lists in 2006 (Jiangsu Culture Department 2006a). Keeping up with pro-
vincial objectives, Changzhou municipality has set up four ICH practice 
lists (Changzhou Culture Bureau 2013a) and four ICH transmitters lists 
(Changzhou Culture Bureau 2013b). While Jiangsu’s provincial govern-
ment attempts to display a forerunner role in ICH safeguarding through 
providing f inancial opportunities such as granting ICH transmitters 
additional stipends (Jiangsu Culture Department 2006b), Changzhou’s 
culture bureau has established a strategic partnership with Changzhou 
University (Interview 19/2015). Due to the provincial aspiration to dem-
onstrate successful ICH safeguarding, according to an ICH transmitter 
from Changzhou, many opportunities arise for ICH transmitters to take 
part in international and domestic events and market their products 
(Interview 18/2015).
Jiangxi Province, on the other hand, has hitherto pursued different 
objectives. Not only did the provincial government issue its own ICH 
policy comparatively late in 2015 (Jiangxi Culture Department 2015), it 
was also rather reluctant to invest in ICH safeguarding as it regards itself 
as an ‘underdeveloped province’ (qian fada de sheng) (Interview 48/2015). 
Nevertheless, Jiujiang municipality has hitherto established f ive ICH 
items lists (Jiujiang Culture Bureau 2015) and three ICH transmitters lists 
(Jiujiang Culture Bureau 2013). Due to their ‘underdeveloped’ economy, 
as one ICH transmitter from Hukou, Jiujiang municipality, stated, neither 
the provincial nor the municipal government pays stipends to their ICH 
transmitters (Interview 5/2014). Another ICH transmitter from Pingxiang 
municipality argued that ICH transmitters only seldom have the oppor-
tunity to take part in events abroad (Interview 4/2015). Due to the lack of 
f inancial support, many ICH transmitters from Jiangxi, therefore, aspire to 
be inscribed on the national list to obtain the full stipend and additional 
opportunities that come with national recognition (Interview 26/2015). 
Whereas the implementation of the ICH items and transmitters lists along 
the four-tier administrative system already creates an institutionalized 
hierarchy, the different economic and political circumstances in each 
province lead to further inequalities between local communities and 
ICH transmitters’ access to opportunities to safeguard local ICH. These 
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geographical differences in policy implementation moreover create a 
greater pressure for local communities and ICH transmitters to have 
their traditional practices listed on the national level, in order to obtain 
additional funding opportunities. In competing over inclusion and promo-
tion, local communities and ICH transmitters have developed a variety of 
strategies to compete for selection which result in conflicts between local 
communities and practitioners.
Developing bottom-up strategies in heritage competition
In order to compete in the selection process, local communities and cultural 
practitioners employ personal contacts (see Chan in this volume), off icial 
heritage discourses as well as heritage expertise to get ahead of their com-
petition. In the case of the ICH transmitters list, social connections (or 
guanxi)6 are essential for entering and advancing within the programme. 
According to an ICH transmitter from Nanjing (Jiangsu Province), many 
of the ‘higher ranking’ ICH transmitters obtained the title during an early 
phase of the programme when it was still quite unknown. They were able 
to do so as the cultural practitioners knew a government off icial and were 
able to use their social connections to be inscribed as ICH transmitter. 
Subsequently, due to their early entry into the programme and their social 
connections it was easier for them to be promoted to upper levels. This 
creates comparative disadvantages for other cultural practitioners. The 
ICH transmitter from Nanjing further argued that after this initial phase 
it has become increasingly diff icult to become part of the programme and 
subsequently be promoted within the system as competition among the 
ICH transmitters has become f ierce (Interview 15/2015). These f indings also 
correspond with interviews made in Jiangxi Province. In the interviews, ICH 
transmitters frequently mentioned that local ICH associations, their work 
unit (danwei) or local scholars informed them about the programme and 
subsequently supported them in taking part. Thus cultural practitioners 
who maintain social ties with people or groups of higher social standing 
such as off icials, experts or other cultural elites, may use them to obtain 
information or be recommended for the programme or, conversely, may 
be promoted due to personal interests of these more powerful people and 
groups. In Hukou, a county of Jiujiang, for instance, one local scholar ap-
peared to be a facilitator in this regard as he persuaded at least one local 
6 cf. Thomas et al. 2002.
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opera performer and one producer of traditional tofu products to submit 
an application. Furthermore, he also assisted them in f iling the application 
(Interview 28-30/2015).
As the scholar frequently advises the local government in their ICH re-
lated work and is a member of the selection committee (Interview 28/2015), 
he is also very familiar with the off icial heritage discourse. For this reason, 
the scholar would not only be able to use his heritage-related expertise to 
assist the cultural practitioners in their application, but may also influence 
the local government’s decision on which cultural practitioner to select for 
the programme. Similarly, once a cultural practitioner becomes a member 
of the programme, he or she may employ the off icial heritage discourse as 
well as heritage expertise to advance within the programme. In an interview 
with a local transmitter in Jiujiang, the transmitter stated that he was 
thinking of inviting a scholar who could advise him in how to f ill out his 
application for promotion within the programme (Interview 27/2015). As 
the ICH transmitter had already advanced to the provincial level of the 
programme, he thus sought scholarly expertise to get ahead in the f ierce 
competition over national inscription. While in the example above social 
ties were used to receive information about or a recommendation for the 
programme, these ties may also be used to obtain scholarly expertise related 
to the off icial discourse.
Secondly, family ties play an important role in being listed as an ICH 
transmitter. During f ield research, I found that many of the ICH transmit-
ter’s family members and students also become ICH transmitters, resulting 
in clusters of ICH transmitters among families or schools. Speaking of 
another ICH transmitter, one national ICH expert, for instance, explained 
that ‘When the programme started it was his grandfather who took part, 
then it was he himself who participated, followed by his grandson. After-
wards his grandfather’s or his friend participated. They are all like this’ 
(Interview 3/2014). Access to the ICH transmitter programme is thus easier 
for candidates who already have social connections within the programme 
or know a person who is well versed in the off icial heritage discourse. Cul-
tural practitioners who have such social connections or are able to employ 
heritage scholars thus use these resources strategically to be selected for 
the programme. Conversely, cultural practitioners who do not have these 
resources are in a comparatively disadvantaged position, ultimately losing 
in the competition for inscription.
Finally, ICH transmitters and general cultural practitioners use their 
own financial resources to enhance their standing and voice in the heritage 
discourse. By publishing articles and books on their traditional cultural 
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practice they contribute to the discourse, obtaining agency among their 
peers. A county-level ICH transmitter in Jiujiang, for instance, explained 
that he attempts to publish as much as possible on his local cultural tradi-
tion. As he, however, does not have a high income and only gets sporadic 
f inancial support, he has troubles funding his publications:
I have to tell you that it is hard to obtain money, sometimes they [the 
government] don’t give you any [money], other times they do something 
in your name, it is diff icult to say. […] I paid for the research myself. All the 
things that I have written I have paid for myself, not the government. This 
means everything you research, you f inance yourself. (Interview 5/2014)
Conducting research or generating heritage expertise is thus a further 
strategy which ICH transmitters employ to enhance their agency within 
the heritage discourse. However, as cultural practitioners often rely on their 
art or craft to earn their monthly income, it is diff icult to obtain a voice in 
the discourse without suff icient f inancial resources.
Local communities have utilized similar strategies to inf luence the 
selection of local ICH practices for the ‘ICH items list’. As they are excluded 
from selection, they attempt to influence the governmental off icials and 
experts involved in the decision-making process. As one national ICH expert 
explains, local communities often directly contact the Ministry of Culture 
or experts in order to convince them to choose a particular ICH practice 
for the list (Interview 13/2015). As in the case of the ICH transmitters, they 
do use informal channels to persuade the local governments and involved 
experts of the value of their particular ICH practice. This f inding is in line 
with Ku (2014), who has found that local communities in Fujian have hired 
an ICH expert to compile a dossier on local heritage which could be handed 
over to the local government. Local communities thus seek to enhance their 
agency through means of direct persuasion and appropriation of scientif ic 
expertise. In doing so, they similarly use their social connections to govern-
ment off icials and experts or f inancial resources to win the competition 
of ICH inscription.
According to a Jiangsu Province ICH off icial, the local community 
furthermore attempts to influence the ICH nomination and selection in 
order to preserve their cultural self-esteem:
This happens a lot. It has to do with their cultural self-esteem, ICH is 
the cultural basis of their life. Naturally, the culture that their own com-
munity likes must be the best one, but they do not have any comparison. 
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This is a common thing. It is a good thing as it demonstrates their cultural 
self-confidence and self-esteem. It is a good thing, yet this kind of situa-
tion needs to be resolved through [off icial] procedures. You cannot just 
say I should change something and then I will change it. This is not 
possible. (Interview 16/2015)
This statement demonstrates that it is of great importance to members of the 
local community that their traditional practice is selected as a representa-
tive of local ICH. After the government off icials and experts collectively 
review and nominate certain ICH items for the list, they are obliged to 
publish this nomination list online and provide the general public with 
the opportunity to respond to this nomination within 20 days (Jiangsu 
Culture Department 2015). Many members of the local community, however, 
seem to seek to influence the selection process at an earlier stage, thereby 
circumventing the formal procedures.
While local communities attempt to influence the local government 
and experts to select their preferred ICH practice for the ICH items list, 
also local government off icials develop strategies to get ahead in regional 
competition for ICH inscription. According to an ICH off icial in Jiujiang, 
the municipality hired provincial-level experts to assist them in rebranding 
their local opera performance. As all the surrounding municipalities were 
home to a local variant of the same opera tradition, the off icial was eager to 
make Jiujiang’s version of the opera stand out in contrast to the traditional 
practice of other municipals. The ICH items list had thus created competi-
tion between different government agencies. To gain the upper hand in this 
competition, he therefore invited an ICH expert familiar with the provincial 
inscription process and the heritage discourse to the municipality. The 
expert recommended to use an ancient name which was used during the 
Ming dynasty instead, thereby rebranding the local opera and providing 
it with a new historical narrative (Interview 6/2014). As a member of the 
local community, ICH government officials who are commonly also cultural 
practitioners themselves may also have an intrinsic motivation to develop 
strategies which will advance their locality’s ICH in the regional competi-
tion for inscription. Nevertheless, as government off icials are evaluated 
according to their performance in ICH protection (Interview 19/2015), they 
may also attempt to enhance the municipality’s location branding and 
tourism industry out of personal career ambitions.
All in all, local communities and practitioners develop a number of strate-
gies to get ahead in the competition for inscription on the ICH items and 
transmitters lists. In doing so, they commonly choose informal channels to 
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exert influence on local decision-making, particularly by employing personal 
connections or contacting involved government officials and experts directly. 
They furthermore frequently employ the off icial heritage discourse and 
heritage expertise in order to legitimize their claim, if need be by investing 
their own social connections and financial resources. As the individual ac-
tors, however, differ in their opinion which ICH practice is to be selected and 
compete for inclusion in the ICH transmitters programme or the ICH items 
list, contestations arise which cause conflicts among the local stakeholders.
Local contestation over heritage representation
Conflicts mainly arise over whose culture is off icially recognized as ICH 
and who f inancially benef its from inscription. Inscribing a traditional 
cultural practice on the safeguarding list implies that this traditions is not 
only considered to be worthy of governmental protection, but it also implies 
that this tradition will represent the variety of similar local traditions to 
the wider public, domestically and internationally. The authority over the 
representation of local ICH, including its meaning and understanding, is 
therefore of great importance to the ICH transmitters. One ICH transmitter, 
for instance, argued that his title also provided him with the opportunity 
to enhance his reputation across China (Interview 22/2015). Domestic and 
international government-organized exhibitions, performances and media 
broadcastings facilitate knowledge on the particular ICH practice and ad-
vance the esteem of the transmitter. In some cases also foreign universities 
or overseas Chinese organizations invited ICH transmitters on their own 
account (Interview 15/2015, 17/2015, 22/2015). Among the interviewees, all 
provincial- and national-level ICH inheritors and some municipal ICH 
inheritors (all in Jiangsu) have had the opportunity to demonstrate their 
ICH abroad at least once (for instance, interviews 14/2015, 15/2015, 17/2015, 
21/2015, 22/2015). By being inscribed on one of the ICH lists, ICH items and 
ICH transmitters thus become the off icial representative or showcase for 
a greater variety of similar traditional practices.
This showcasing of selected ICH practices and practitioners does not only 
have implications for the pride and self-perception of local communities, 
but may also entail f inancial ramif ications for them. In the case of the ICH 
transmitters programme, the f inancial betterment does not result from the 
annual governmental subsidy but from the opportunity to sell one’s tradi-
tional cultural products or performance, for instance, as an off icial Chinese 
ICH item. In the same way as intangible cultural heritage is exploited as a 
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cultural resource (Blake 2009: 64), the title of ‘ICH item’ or ‘ICH transmitter’ 
also becomes a sort of brand or resource which the cultural practitioner 
can use to sell the ICH he or she is representing – often at a higher price 
(Interview 26/2015). As a national ICH expert explains, exploiting the ICH 
label as a brand is a common phenomenon:
It [the food] is perhaps not as famous, but he [the merchant] hangs up a 
sign saying ‘national ICH’ and perhaps attracts a few customers. In this 
instance the merchant is using a branding strategy. […] This happens 
all the time. He really uses national ICH in order to earn some money. 
So he spends a lot of physical and mental efforts to achieve this state. 
(Interview 7/2014)
Using the off icial ‘ICH transmitter’ title as a marketing device has thus 
the potential of yielding considerable economic benefits. In an interview 
with a family in Jiujiang producing traditional huangjiu (yellow liquor), the 
municipal ICH transmitters explained that in some cases cultural products 
Figure 5.2  ICH transmitter exhibiting and selling his art at an ICH exhibition in 
Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, 2015
photograph by Christina Maags
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by ICH transmitters become so expensive that locals cannot afford the 
product anymore. The price for regional fenggangjiu (type of liquor), for 
instance, had risen from 20 to several hundred RMB. When asked whether 
the price of the liquor they were producing had increased she confirmed, 
smiled and added that it was not as expensive as fenggangjiu (Interview 
26/2015). The ‘ICH brand’, however, was visible on the bottle as it displayed 
the Chinese logo for national intangible cultural heritage (see f igure 11).
Among the interviewees, a majority conf irmed that becoming ICH 
transmitters had either boosted their sales or led to an increase in product 
price (Interview 14/2015, 17/2015, 26/2015). In addition, the ICH transmit-
ters also obtain the opportunity to display and sell their products at 
regional, national or even international events. For this reason, they may 
not only sell their products at a higher price but may also acquire more 
customers.
Compared to ICH transmitters, cultural practitioners who are not in 
the programme do not necessarily have these economic benefits. Both the 
off icial recognition and the economic commercialization create a process 
of exclusion for cultural practitioners not involved in the programme. 
These cultural practitioners, f irstly, do not receive any annual subsidy and, 
secondly, do not benefit from being able to sell their cultural practice or 
goods with the help of the ‘ICH brand’. While the subsidy does not account 
for that much of the annual income of any cultural practitioner, when it 
comes to selling traditional cultural products they f ind themselves in a 
position of comparative economic disadvantage. Cultural practitioners 
not able to use the ‘ICH brand’ to market their products cannot ‘prove’ that 
their products are representing the traditional culture of the region. This 
leads to a form of exclusion as their products are not necessarily considered 
‘authentic’ representatives of regional ICH, which simultaneously devalues 
these products.
In competing for selection for governmental lists and programmes, lo-
cal communities and cultural practitioners therefore contest each other’s 
representativeness and abilities which creates conflicts among them. The 
practice of selecting a few local practitioners for a programme marginalizes 
other practitioners leading to arguments and contestations over the listings 
(Interview 3/2014, 6/2014, 15/2015). One ICH expert, for instance, explained:
Let’s say the four of us could have done almost the same thing, we are almost 
the same and suddenly the media reported on me, I became a celebrity, you 
three, however, didn’t become well-known, this will hurt your self-esteem, 
then you don’t do it anymore, this is not right. (Interview 7/2014)
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This statement and other conducted interviews demonstrate that in some 
cases the contestations had even gone so far that some cultural practition-
ers ceased to perform an ICH practice (Interview 3/2014, 15/2015). These 
contestations not only occur over who is selected for the ICH transmitters 
programme but also who advances within the programme. In comparing 
Figure 5.3  Liquor bottle with ICH logo produced by ICH transmitter in Jiujiang
photograph by Christina Maags
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his own abilities to those of a colleague, for instance, one ICH transmitter 
explained that his colleague, a fellow paper cutter, had expressed jealousy 
when he was selected for promotion, while the colleague himself was not:
He [paper cutter] is over 80 years old. He told me, ‘I have been in this 
profession for over 60 years and you are much younger than I am. How 
did you become a national ICH transmitter while I am only a provincial 
one?’ He really felt he had not been treated fairly, so this created a bit of 
a conflict. (Interview 22/2015)
A majority of the interviewees argued that the non-ICH transmitters were 
‘jealous’ ( jidu) of the ICH transmitters’ position in society (Interview 18/2015, 
22/2015). Although this statement refers to a subjective judgement of the 
interviewees, it does express potential feelings of exclusion among non-ICH 
transmitters when their colleague is proclaimed an official representative of 
local culture and praised as ‘outstanding’, while they are not. These inclusion 
and exclusion effects – similar to the observations made with international 
listings of ICH items at the UNESCO (cf. Kuutma 2007: 178) – create hierarchies 
among cultural practitioners, particularly between the ICH transmitters in the 
programme, which in turn result in contestations about the representativeness 
and abilities of the individuals. In addition, not only the abilities as a cultural 
practitioner are contested but also the way in which one has entered the 
programme. As stated above, some ICH transmitters obtained the position due 
to knowing people. As Smith and Waterton (2009) have reminded us, ‘heritage 
is a process through which individuals and collectives negotiate their social 
position and “place” within particular societies’ (2009: 293). In this instance, 
however, cultural practitioners who are already equipped with social capital or 
hold a relatively strong societal standing are more frequently selected, leading 
to reinforcement of the social position of advantaged members of society, 
while also reinforcing the comparative ‘disadvantaged’ position of others.
Ultimately, the ICH items and transmitters lists thus lead to the formation 
of hierarchies and conflicts among cultural practitioners and local commu-
nities. Through the selection of particular ICH practices and transmitters, 
these local communities and cultural practitioners receive the opportunity 
to generate f inancial capital (annual stipends, usage of ICH brand, tourism 
development) and to represent local ICH regionally, nationally and interna-
tionally. The majority of the local communities and cultural practitioners, 
however, do not receive this opportunity. Although their position as such 
has not been altered, they are now in a place of comparative disadvantage. 
This f inding conf irms what Hafstein has argued earlier, namely that 
This content downloaded from 195.195.176.5 on Thu, 13 Jun 2019 12:07:05 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
Creating a raCe to tHe top 139
programmes on ICH safeguarding ‘intervene in social processes in order 
to change them. Safeguarding itself is a change. It is a change in relations’ 
(2007: 81). Identifying certain traditional cultural practices as ICH thus 
changes the underlying social fabric of society.
Conclusion
On the basis of a comparison between ICH items and transmitters lists in 
two different provinces, this chapter has demonstrated that the top-down 
formulation and implementation of these policies creates hierarchies and 
division among local communities and cultural practitioners. On the one 
hand, the policy design listing ICH items and transmitters on four different 
governmental levels creates an internal hierarchy which leads to a ‘race to 
the top’ among the local communities and cultural practitioners eager to 
inscribe their local traditional practice and climb the institutional ladder. 
On the other hand, local communities and cultural practitioners whose ICH 
practice or product is not selected are in the position of a comparative dis-
advantage. The political and social recognition of heritage thus ultimately 
creates distinctions between cultural practitioners which have profound 
impacts on how ICH is transmitted and by whom. While these exclusion 
and inclusion effects have been similarly mentioned in other studies, the 
Chinese inscription system for ICH items and ICH transmission stands out 
as it adds internal competition to these effects in the form of its four-tier 
inscription hierarchy.
Moreover, due to the prerogative of the government-scholar evaluation 
committee to select ICH items and transmitters for inscription, the local 
community does not obtain the right to decide for themselves who is repre-
sentative of their local ICH. As a result, certain ICH items and transmitters 
are legitimized as rightful representatives of local culture, thus gaining 
authority over its meaning and understanding, while the majority of ICH 
practices and cultural practitioners are excluded. These inclusion and exclu-
sion effects give rise to competition among the local stakeholders involved 
who develop bottom-up strategies aimed at enhancing their agency within 
the heritagization process. In competing for inscription, these stakeholders 
appropriate their personal f inancial and social resources, particularly their 
social connections, as well as the off icial heritage discourse and heritage 
expertise to gain the upper hand in the competition. As a result, contesta-
tions over claims to represent local traditional culture and the opportunity 
to obtain f inancial resources arise in a plurality of forms. For these reasons, 
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the top down formulation and implementation of the policy seems to not 
only not enhance the transmission of local traditional culture, but also 
partly to discourage local practitioners from continuing their work as a 
whole, as they feel marginalized from their right of cultural representation. 
Yet, more research is needed concerning which ramif ications top-down 
policy formulation and implementation of so-called ‘best practices’ in the 
f ield of ICH protection have for local stakeholders involved. In particular, 
more knowledge needs to be generated on how the implementation of ICH 
policies creates ‘windows of opportunities’ for local actors to advance their 
individual agency and which resulting local inclusion and exclusion effects 
can be observed. In shedding light on these questions, it will become easier 
to differentiate whether these implications are due to def iciencies in the 
policy design itself or in the way local stakeholders implement the policy.
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